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The computer market in Brazil is dominated by domestic private companies that compete with large multinational companies. 
This study aims, based on the case of Positivo Informatics, to discuss how national companies can compete in complex markets 
accumulating technological and non-technological competences. The theory on technological paradigms allows dividing the 
world computer industry into two groups: the companies that master the paradigm core, responsible for pushing forward the 
technological frontier; and the companies whose competences are focused on complementary elements of the paradigm. The 
analysis of Positivo Informatics shows that the elements providing it with competitiveness do not depend on its technological 
competences. The elements that keep the industry competitive are derived from the expansion of consumption among lower 
classes and company specialization in this population. We conclude that, in Brazil, the computer industry keeps being 
competitive without developing technological competences.  
 
 1. INTRODUCTION 
The world computer industry may be highlighted through its continued and always breakthrough 
technological development. This never-stopping evolution means that this industry has 
experienced several paradigmatic changes over the years. Thus, the computer industry may be an 
interesting context for studying the role of paradigms with regard to the development of 
technological capabilities by a company.  
The concept of technological paradigms, proposed by Dosi (2006), enables us to deal 
with innovations in the computer industry as a systemic action driven by a group of companies. In 
this system, each component has different effects on the industry technological trajectory. The 
many components of the computer paradigm are distinguished as levels of appropriability(see 
DOSI, 1982, 1984 and 1988) and opportunity. 
The world computer industry, nowadays conditioned by the so-called Wintel paradigm 
(Wintel is the combination of Windows, the operational system created by Microsoft and Intel, the 
microprocessor producer), may be divided into two groups of companies. The first group 
comprises two enterprises, Microsoft and Intel, responsible for constructing the computer’s 
platform, which is the operational system and the microprocessor. The second group consists of 
the companies that master the secondary or peripheral competences of the paradigm, related to the 
production of components that will be connected to the computer platform.  
The key characteristic of the paradigm involves the commitment of companies to the 
second group, developing innovations that must be compatible to the platform made by Microsoft 
and Intel; this way, a hierarchy between the first and second group of companies is set within the 
paradigm, with a direct implication for the competitiveness of computer companies. 
Almost all computer producers, the focus of this article, rely on innovations to create 
differentials and advantages, in order to keep their competitiveness. The dynamic innovative 
behavior can be better observed in the computer global players. Although having huge 
technological advantages over the Brazilian companies some major computer enterprises 
established in Brazil, such as Dell, HP, Samsung, among others, are not leading players in the 
Brazilian market. In 2010, 4 domestic companies had 24% of total market share (the 8 biggest 
computer producers controlled over 51% of the national market). The Brazilian company called 
Positivo Informatics had almost 16% of the national market; in 2011, its market share was 15.6%.  
Data mentioned above shows that the national private companies, especially Positivo 
Informatics, are able to compete with multinational corporations and even gain market share over 
them. The Brazilian computer industry has a paradox that can hardly be seen in other high 
technology sectors: indeed, it is clear that the national computer producers play a distinguished 
role when competitiveness is analyzed in Brazil.  
The Brazilian paradox brings up the discussion about technology as a 
competitiveness driver in the national computer industry. In order to add new features to 
this heavily debated theme, we analyzed the way how hierarchies observed in a paradigm 
can change the development of competences by a company. Based on the Positivo 
Informatics case, this article aims to discuss how the national companies are able to 
compete in complex markets accumulating both technological and non-technological 
competences. Positivo Informatics presents itself as an example to make clear why the 
Brazilian computer industry is characterized by the high competitiveness of nationally 
owned enterprises. This article shows that, in Brazil, technological competences are 
important elements to improve competitiveness, but non-technological competences may 
not be neglected as variables that can keep the competitiveness of computer producers. 
For achieving the proposed goal, this article is divided into five sections, in 
addition to the introduction and conclusion. The next section describes the Wintel 
paradigm, in order to identify the competitiveness drivers in the world computer industry. 
The third section presents the methods used in the study. The fourth section briefly 
describes the national computer industry from 1993 on. The fifth section discusses the 
peculiarity of the Brazilian computer industry through the Positivo Informatics case. The 
last section discusses the competences of Positivo Informatics with regard to its 




2. THE WORLD COMPUTER INDUSTRY UNDER THE WINTEL 
PARADIGM 
2.1. Theory Background 
Before discussing the world computer industry, it is important to introduce and discuss some 
concepts on which this article is based, i.e.: (i) technological paradigms; (ii) technological 
trajectories; (iii) technological competences; and (iv) non-technological competences. 
Technological paradigms constitute a concept proposed by Dosi (1982; 2006, p. 
152) “as ‘model’ and a ‘pattern’ of solution of selected technological problems, based on 
selected principles derived from natural sciences and on selected material technologies”. 
Dosi’s idea of a technological paradigm is based on the main claim of Thomas Khun’s 
The structure of scientific revolutions, where the author argues that science is presented 
as a general model able to answer to the questions posed by the natural world by means 
of the scientific advance. Both scientific and technological paradigms are successful if they are 
effective to solve the problems presented to them. This way, technology is a model for 
constructing artifacts with certain and desired economic qualities.  
The technological paradigm is the structure allowing a technology to be constructed, the 
progress of any kind of technology is somehow framed by the paradigm borders and the way how 
technical progress is conducted is defined as technological trajectories (DOSI, 1982; 1988; 2006). 
Within a paradigm, there can be numerous technological trajectories.  
In the process for developing a technological trajectory, the company must be able to 
construct its artifacts; the ability of producing several artifacts the same way may be named 
competence. The notion of competences is derived from the concept of routines proposed by 
Nelson and Winter (1982); routines are the daily tasks fulfilled by the company.  
The company capacity to make things its own way constitutes its competences. Those 
related to technology are defined as technological competences, for instance: an enterprise, 
through the R & D (research and development) process, develops the ability to construct 
semiconductors, in other words, the company acquires the competence of producing 
semiconductors by means of routine tasks. The competences not related to technologies - the non-
technological competences - are those related to the value chain management or the ability to sell 
directly to customers, as Dell, for instance, which created the direct sale process. The non-
technological competences of Dell had no influence on its competences to produce computers. 
These concepts are very important. They allow us to see a company as part of a system, 
in which not everything is possible, answers by the enterprise must observe the competitive 
process and the technological structure set by the paradigm. All these components are tightly 
connected, so that technological paradigms set the whole structure, the technological trajectory is a 
way to conduct the technical progress within the paradigm. The competences acquired through R 
& D allow the company to create a technological trajectory.  
The neo-Schumpeterian approach advocates for a direct relationship between the 
accumulation of technological competences and the improvement of competitiveness (FREEMAN, 
2004; BELL; PAVITT, 1993; 1995; LALL, 1990; 1992). It shows to be complex, in a 
Schumpeterian theory, to understand the construction and maintenance of competitiveness without 
relying on any technological variables. This article explains that it is possible for a company to be 
competitive by means of distinguished technological capabilities.  
2.2.  The Competitive Process under the Wintel Paradigm 
This section divides the world computer industry into two groups, or tiers, of companies: the 
paradigm core (first tier), and the companies focused on secondary elements of the paradigm 
(second tier). The existence of such groups has direct implications for the innovative efforts of an 
enterprise. 
In the early 1990s, the Wintel paradigm was on the rise, Microsoft and Intel 
combined, and through their main products the computer’s platform was constitute 
(BRESNAHAN; GREENSTEIN, 1999). According to Bresnahan and Greenstein (1999, 
p. 5), platform is “a bundle of standard components around which buyers and sellers 
coordinate efforts”. The platform is, therefore, the key component of computer industry; 
all companies, during their innovation process, must consider the way how the 
components produced by them may be connected to the platform. 
The continued leadership of Microsoft and Intel has led to a standardization of 
the industry around the Wintel platform. These companies enjoy a privileged position, 
from where they can set the industry technological requirements by means of the 
platform. The computer producer must be committed to technological prescriptions of the 
platform, in order to provide effective components. Thus, the companies focused on 
elements of the second tier, involving technological development tied to the platform 
development (BRESNAHAN; GREENSTEIN, 1999).  
Considering the importance of the platform for the computer firm, how can the 
companies deal with the platform conditioning elements? This answer may be given in a 
brief discussion about the IBM entry into the personal computer (PC). IBM entered the 
PC age constructing a computer by means of several suppliers, in a “deverticalized” way 
(TEECE, 1986; STURGEON, 2002). The company strategy was focusing on its 
capabilities with regard to sale channels and organization of suppliers (BRESNAHAN, 
2007; BRESNAHAN; GREENSTEIN, 1999; TEECE, 1986; BRESNAHAN; 
MALERBA, 1999). 
IBM chose Intel and Microsoft as the platform suppliers, thus, these companies 
regarded the technological competences as a key element of the industry. IBM lost 
industry control when the computer platform was outsourced, and the company can no 
longer hold the competences which define the industry technical advance and 
technological trajectory. Thus, in the PC age, Intel and Microsoft became responsible for 
setting the industry technological frontier in the world market, in other words, these firms 
are in control of the computer industry paradigm (BRESNAHAN, 2007; BRESNAHAN; 
GREENSTEIN, 1999).  
This process defined the Wintel paradigm rise, and it was not encompassed by 
a technological breakthrough: nevertheless, this process ended up in the exit of IBM from 
the PC segment and the transference of industry leadership to Intel and Microsoft 
(BRESNAHAN, 2007; BRESNAHAN; GREENSTEIN, 1999; HAGEDOORN; 
CARAUANNIS; ALEXANDER, 2001). The origins of the Wintel paradigm are pointed 
out by Hagedoorn, Carauannis, and Alexander (2001). These authors argue that the Wintel 
paradigm is a kind of hybrid from the IBM/PC paradigm and the Apple/Macintosh paradigm. The 
Wintel standard borrowed Macintosh’s user-friendly features, such as the icons. From the IBM/PC 
paradigm, Wintel inherited the Microsoft’s operational system Windows and the Intel’s 
microprocessor; besides, IBM/PC contributed with the “deverticalized” way the computer industry 
is organized (HAGEDOORN; CARAUANNIS; ALEXANDER, 2001).  
Intel and Microsoft established the industry technological standards by mastering the 
paradigm core. The platform segment was surrounded by highly complex competences which 
create entry barriers extremely difficult to be overcome by other companies in the computer 
industry. As paradigm rulers, Intel and Microsoft enjoyed a high appropriability level (DEDRICK; 
KRAEMER; LINDEN, 2009). These characteristics constitute a mechanism which keeps these 
companies as platform leaders (DEDRICK; KRAEMER, 2008; DEDRICK; KRAEMER; 
LINDEN, 2009). 
The other companies held the so-called secondary competences which have minimal 
influence on the industry technological trajectory. They operate outside the paradigm core and 
must fit their innovation processes with regard to technological prescriptions designed by Intel and 
Microsoft. Hence, all innovations introduced by these companies are technologically constrained 
by the standards posed by Intel and Microsoft (BRESNAHAN, 2007; BRESNAHAN; 
GREENSTEIN, 1999; DEDRICK; KRAEMER, 2008). Although computer producers are tied to 
the secondary paradigm elements, these elements are diversified enough to provide the companies 
with some room to innovate.  
The existence of two distinguished groups in the computer industry is crucial to explain 
the technological limitations experienced by the second group of companies. These firms are 
specialized in non-core computer components, such as wireless and battery technologies 
(DEDRICK; KRAEMER, 2008).  
Innovations based on the secondary paradigm elements have a low appropriability, as 
Dedrick, Kraemer, and Linden (2009) demonstrated in their analysis of the HP nc6230 notebook 
value chain. These authors investigated which companies in the value chain are able to extract 
most of the product value. As a conclusion, Dedrick, Kraemer, and Linden (2009) claim that the 
Wintel paradigm leaders managed to catch more value than all other companies, even HP. The 
conclusion of Dedrick, Kraemer, and Linden (2009) is similar to that found by Teece (1986); 
according to this author, in a high appropriability regime, companies which control the paradigm 
core can have a higher profit over their own innovations. Teece (1986) also showed that in low 
appropriability regimes, companies holding complementary capacities over the paradigm core have 
increasing difficulties to profit from their own innovations, such as computer producers.  
Computer companies, thus, enjoy low appropriability with regard to their innovations, 
whereas the key elements are dominated by Intel and Microsoft. In this case, if producers wish to 
differentiate their products by adding innovations, there is no certainty that the customer 
is willing to accept and pay for that differentiation (DEDRICK; KRAEMER, 2008). 
Two interesting examples may be cited as innovative answers given by 
computer producers to avoid or diminish the low appropriability with regard to the 
paradigm. The first is the creation of direct sales, an innovation which excluded retailers 
from the value chain and allowed Dell to catch more value through its own innovations 
and computers (KRAEMER; DEDRICK, 2001). The other example is provided by 
Dedrick, Kraemer, and Linden (2009), by analyzing the n630 HP notebook; the authors 
pointed out that HP made a lighter notebook using a different material than plastic. 
Company concerns to develop new competences, complementary to the paradigm core, 
constitute a key process in order to be a competitive player within a paradigm. 
Computer companies must keep their competitiveness by means of a strong 
innovative behavior. Some examples of computer producers are Lenovo, Dell, HP, and 
Positivo Informatics. These firms are basically focused on two products, desktops and 
notebooks, which have many differences from each other (DEDRICK; KRAEMER, 
2008). The secondary capacities held by computer companies in the desktop segment are 
focused on the value chain end. Thus, these companies are devoted to sales and market 
identification, whereas the secondary competences related to notebooks are rather 
knowledge-driven and related to engineering and development of certain kinds of 
components.  
The accumulation of technological competences is essential for the company to 
improve its competitiveness; according to Dedrick and Kraemer (2008), these 
competences, in the desktop segment, are: (i) combining software and hardware to work 
together in a more effective way; (ii) innovations related to the firm’s brand; (iii) user 
interface; (iv) cost reduction; and (v) quality improvement. The production of desktops 
basically relies on highly standardized components offered by many suppliers; it is 
possible to assemble a desktop using components provided by different companies. This 
equipment is, somehow, very simple to produce and the components do not need any 
adjustment to fit within the desktop. 
The notebook segment is far more complex. The decreased size of these devices 
requires advanced competences on engineering, especially those related to energy 
consumption and battery autonomy. Although notebooks have some standard 
components, most of them are very specific to each model, such as batteries and 
motherboards (DEDRICK; KRAEMER, 2008). Notebook components require a specific 
shape and size to fit into the small space designed to each of them; kits have been 
produced and sold as a closed package by an only supplier, generally an original device 
manufacturer (ODM).  
This closed package is named barebone, containing all computer parts except memories, 
hard disks, and other standard components. Each notebook package is closely related to the device 
architecture, thus, it is difficult to assemble a notebook relying on several suppliers, and it is also 
impossible to design different notebook families with the same components, because each 
component is specific to each notebook family. Indeed, if the computer producers wish to change 
the design of their notebooks and add some special features, the knowledge needed for this kind of 
activity is highly complex and competences related to component engineering are required. This 
way, the notebook size becomes a barrier to the addition of new features. For conducting such 
activities, computer producers need to master abilities aimed at reducing the number or size of 
components.  
The technological differences of products demand from the companies distinguished 
groups of abilities to deal with innovations related to the production of this kind of equipment. 
Desktops are technologically stable products and the major innovations are generated by suppliers, 
especially platform constructors. Computer companies just assemble the product, without any 
concerns about the engineering of components. Desktops follow a particular trajectory of 
accumulation of competences which mainly involves product cost reduction (DEDRICK; 
KRAEMER, 2008). 
Therefore, the innovation options offered by notebooks in these secondary elements 
allow the computer companies to decrease paradigm constraints. Thus, notebook innovations have 
a higher appropriability level from the point of view of companies. The diversity of innovations 
also leads to the accumulation of competences, which encompasses: (i) improving the 
microprocessor capacity; (ii) reducing energy consumption by this microprocessor; (iii) 
constructing more durable batteries; (iv) improving the notebooks connectivity and portability; and 
(v) using new materials, besides plastic, in notebook construction. All these competences create 
differentiation among notebooks, providing each firm with specific products. 
As discussed in this section, the world computer industry dynamics led to the existence 
of two groups of companies which interact in a hierarchical way. The core paradigm defines the 
technological characteristics by means of the platform; the standards posed by Microsoft and Intel 
constitute technical constraints that all firms should observe. These companies set the industry 
standards, as well as the technological frontiers, defining the industry technological trajectory. The 
other companies are enclosed in the paradigm borders, and they have to deal with paradigm 
constraints by means of their innovative efforts. The less technologically complex products are 
desktops, which provide little space to innovation and, thus, low appropriability for producers. 
However, with regard to more technologically complex devices, such as notebooks, there is a vast 
range of elements which can generate innovations and lead to better conditions in terms of 
notebook innovations.  
Therefore, a strongly innovative behavior on the part of computer producers is a way of 
overcoming paradigm constraints. 
  
3. METHODS 
First, we will present a brief background of the Brazilian computer industry and its technological 
behavior; for this, we used data provided by the Innovation Research (PINTEC) conducted by the 
Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE). We chose as analytical variable the 
expenses on R & D.  
The choice of Positivo Informatics as a case study is based on the distinguished 
role played by this company in the Brazilian computer industry. Positivo Informatics was 
founded in 1989, but only in 2004 it started selling its computers in the retail market. In 
2006, the firm entered the stock market. The sale of desktops and notebooks corresponds 
to 97.6% of Positivo Informatics revenue. Positivo Informatics, as most of the Brazilian 
companies, doesn’t have a strongly innovative behavior. Nevertheless, Positivo 
Informatics has a large market share (15.6%, in 2011) and it holds the market leadership 
position for seven years. In Brazil, Positivo Informatics is able to compete with global 
players, such as Dell, HP, and Lenovo. However, as any other company, Positivo 
Informatics deals with constraints related to the paradigm, with effects on 
competitiveness. Thus, this section aims to discuss the competitiveness of Positivo 
Informatics, focusing on its accumulation of competences.  
The case study was designed by means of two interviews conducted with the 
chief technology officer of Positivo Informatics, Mr. Luiz Mariano Julio, the first on 
March 11th and the second on July 7th, 2011. We also used annual reports of the 
company, from 2004 to 2009.  
4. THE CURRENT BRAZILIAN COMPUTER INDUSTRY: THE 
PERIOD AFTER THE LIBERAL REFORMS  
This section presents the current Brazilian computer industry; our analysis start in 1993, when the 
government established the new information technology policy. This institutional framework 
deployed new actions in Brazil which were important so that the private national companies can 
keep their market share. 
In the 1990s, the Brazilian market was opened to international competition. 
Local companies had to compete with highly effective multinational corporations; at 
first, this fact was regarded as the end of some local companies, especially those 
technologically driven, such as computer producers, but this did not occur, as shown by Table 1. It 
is important to observe that the new information technology policy was able to boost the domestic 
consumption of computers, especially due to tax reduction. In addition, the government established 
a new policy named “Connected PC Program”, which increased sales of computers. 
 
Table 1 – Major computer producers in Brazil. 
Company Market share (1997) Company Market share 
(2009) 
Compaq (USA) 10.40% Positivo (Brazil) 16% 
Itautec (Brazil) 6.80% HP (USA) 7% 
IBM Brasil (USA) 5.60% Dell (USA) 8% 
UIS (Brazil) 4.90% CCE (Brazil) 5% 
Tropcom (Brasil) 4.70% Acer (Taiwan) 4% 
Byte On (Brazil) 3.40% Lenovo (China) 4% 
HP (USA) 3.10% STI (Brazil) 4% 
Microtec (Brazil) 2.90% Itautec (Brazil) 3% 
Fivestar (Brazil) 2.90%   
Accer (Taiwan) 2.50%   
Market share of 
nationally owned 
companies  
25.60% Market share of nationally 
owned companies 
24% 
Market share of 
multinational 
corporations  
21.60% Market share of 
multinational corporations 
28% 
Total 47.20% Total 52% 
Source: Prepared by the authors. 
It is worth highlighting that nationally owned companies have a significant market share. 
This fact draws attention to the competitiveness of these companies across the spectrum of 
technological variables.  
Graphics 1 and 2 display the amount of companies which developed products and 
technologies. 
Graphic 1: Companies that deployed product innovations and innovation level (%) in 2000, 2003, 2005, and 
2008. 
 
Source: Prepared by the authors. 
Graphic 1 shows that, up to 2005, a relative amount of companies deployed 
product innovations. Also in 2005, the innovation level decreased and, in 2008, this 
figure was also severely decreased.  
Graphic 1 indicates that, in Brazil, informatics is not based on the production of 
new computers. As indicated in section 2, what provides the world computer industry 
with its dynamics is the production of technologically new computers that push forward 
technological advances, and computer producers compete in a paradigm where new 
products are extremely important to keep their appropriability. However, in Brazil, the 
number of new products has decreased over the years. This fact, indeed, reveals a certain 
ineffectiveness of the Brazilian industry with regard to the ability to generate new 
products. 
 Graphic 2: Companies that deployed process innovations and innovation level (%) in 2000, 2003, 2005, and 
2008. 
 
Source: Prepared by the authors. 
 
Graphic 2 indicates that, with regard to process innovations, the scenario involves 
companies not committed to increase their productivity and reduce costs. Indeed, graphics 1 and 2 
indicate that the national companies have a passive behavior, they do not foster the ability to 
produce innovation.  
A more comprehensive analysis of the innovative ability of the Brazilian computer 
industry is obtained by investigating what variables are focused by the companies. Graphic 3 
displays the variables where companies have invested their money.  
 Graphic 3: Companies' expenditure (US$ dollars) on innovative activities in 2000, 2003, 2005, and 2008  
 
Source: Prepared by the authors. 
Graphic 3 shows that the overall innovative effort is falling down since 2003. 
The domestic R & D efforts aimed at the construction of technological competences are 
also decreasing. The introduction of technological innovations in the market, on the other 
hand, is increasing. According to IBGE’s PINTEC (2005, our translation),  
 
[…] the introduction of technological innovations in the market comprises sale activities directly 
related to the new or improved product, and it may include: market research, market testing, and 
marketing for launching the product. It excludes the construction of distribution networks for 
innovations. 
The introduction of technological innovations into the market prevents the 
innovative activities to fall down even further, but this variable is not connected to the 
development of new technological competences. Besides, product innovation decrease 
and process innovation stagnation show the lack of a dynamic behavior on the part of 
industry.  
It is not a surprise that the internal R & D efforts are declining because they are 
associated to innovation decrease. The national industry competitiveness may hardly be 
explained by means of its innovative behavior and accumulation of technological 
competences. In order to see what makes a Brazilian company competitive, there is a 
need to analyze it.  
 5. THE POSITIVO CASE 
Positivo Informatics is a Brazilian computer producer whose competences may be divided into 
three competence groups: (i) capabilities required by the PPB(processo produtivo básico; in 
english basic productive process); (ii) competences resulting from the company’s internal efforts; 
and (iii) non-technological competences. The competences accumulated by the PPB are relevant, 
but they will not be discussed in this article. The PPB may be regarded as the minimum 
technological requirement needed for a firm to compete in the Brazilian computer industry. Indeed, 
any company which does not fully benefit from the new information technology law, due to its 
inability to keep pace with the PPB has little chance to survive in this industry. The subsections 
below discuss the technological competences accumulated by means of internal innovative efforts 
and the non-technological competences that are also related to the paradigm constrains and the 
recent government policies.  
5.1.  Accumulation of Technological Competences by Positivo Informatics 
In order to explain the competitiveness of Positivo Informatics, it is extremely important 
to observe that this company, since its entrance in the retail market, has focused on the lower 
income population. Relying on an intensive learning by doing process, the company is able to 
design and produce computers which are not expensive and show a good performance; this 
competence was achieved because of extreme specialization in the lower income population. 
Besides, Positivo Informatics has some hardware competences that allow it to change and 
construct some components without compromising the computer’s performance; these 
competences are mainly obtained by trial and error.  
The software competences held by Positivo Informatics constitute the factor which 
differentiates the company from the other Brazilian firms, especially the operation system and 
BIOS1 optimization. These competences involve the ability to adjust or rewrite some primary 
codes to improve computer’s performance and reduce failures. In other words, software 
optimization allows a better communication between software and hardware.  
In order to develop a competence which allows the company to optimize software, there 
is a need for training conducted by the suppliers, due to the complex knowledge required to learn 
                                                          
 
1 The BIOS are the first codes to be loaded when the computer is turned on. The primary function of the BIOS is to load and 
start the operational system, also the BIOS must recognize and link the computer components “handling” the PC control 
for the user 
 
 
the software code and to change it. This kind of training is associated to the level of trust 
the firm share with its BIOS and operational system suppliers. Nevertheless, it is known 
that no multinational corporation do software optimization in Brazil and few national 
companies are able to do this.  
The Positivo Informatics competence in optimizing software was developed by 
means of training conducted in the USA with the BIOS supplier. Operational system 
optimization required from Positivo Informatics an active interaction with Microsoft: 
first, the company needed to show to Microsoft the competences its R & D team had 
accumulated; then, Microsoft provided Positivo Informatics with the Windows codes. 
This interaction evolved so that, nowadays, Microsoft assists Positivo Informatics in 
some optimization process and even gives some suggestions to it Besides, Positivo 
Informatics is one of the few Brazilian firms relying on Microsoft support for optimizing 
Windows 8, something which is worked on by means of monthly meetings. The 
development of competences is undertaken by Positivo Informatics through interactive 
learning, mainly due to the nature of its products.  
5.2.  The Accumulation of Non-Technological Competences by Positivo Informatics: 
Entrance into the Retail Market 
In its early days, Positivo Informatics produced computers only when the 
government ordered them. However, in 2002, this strategy changed as the Brazilian State 
started buying less computers. In 2004, another Brazilian company, called Metron, the 
market leader in 2002 and 2003, entered into bankruptcy. Metron deserves attention 
because it was a company whose products were found in the major Brazilian retail stores, 
such as: Casas Bahia, Ponto Frio, Extra, and Wal-Mart.  
When Metron bankrupted, a new opportunity emerged in the retail market and 
Positivo Informatics took it. First, the company offered technical assistance with regard 
to the computers sold by Casas Bahia, which could not offer this service anymore due to 
Metron bankruptcy. Not only Positivo Informatics was able to offer such technical 
assistance, but the firm managed to sign an agreement in order to be the exclusive 
desktop supplier of Casas Bahia, the biggest retail store in Brazil. Another element 
providing Positivo Informatics with an advantage over its competitors was hiring the 
whole sales personnel from Metron. Positivo Informatics entered into the retail market in 
such a successful way that after two months the firm had obtained a revenue equal to that 
obtained for the whole year of 2003.  
Casas Bahia became a key partner for Positivo; the exclusivity enjoyed by the 
company as the only desktop supplier created a huge advantage over the competitors. The 
ability of Positivo Informatics to sign such an agreement was due to the business diversity of 
Positivo group; it was already the supplier of advertising material for Casas Bahia. By means of 
the previous agreement, Positivo Informatics became the exclusive computer supplier for Casas 
Bahia, a commercial advantage which also turned it highly dependent on this partner. Sales 
through Casas Bahia amounted to 70% of the revenue of Positivo Informatics in 2008.  
The role played by Casas Bahia with regard to the competitiveness of Positivo 
Informatics is indisputable, but the company tried to diversify its market scope in other retail 
stores using its many brands, i.e.: (i) Positivo, the main company brand, sold for retailers only as a 
closed package by a minimum price; (ii) Sim+, simpler and cheaper computers which may be 
bought separately by retailers; (iii) Kennex, a strategic acquisition made to enter into the Pão de 
Açúcar group; and (iii) Neo PC, a brand created to enter into the Ponto Frio retail stores.  
Positivo Informatics started selling computers in the retail market when it became the 
only desktop supplier for Casas Bahia, whose customers are mainly from the poorer social strata 
in Brazil (classes C and D). The successful trajectory of Positivo Informatics is, to a large extent, 
explained by the adequacy of its computers to the customers of Casas Bahia. Indeed, the 
specialization of Positivo Informatics in a specific population reflects its entrance into the retail 
market. The company consolidated itself in the Brazilian social strata showing the biggest increase 
in consumption over the recent years (Table 2), and this was crucial for expanding the company 
and increasing its accumulation of competence 
Table 2 – Brazilian households with PCs (%).  
Social 
stratum 
Number of households (millions) 2005 2006 2007 2008 
A 2.5 89.5 86 88 95 
B 5.1 56.9 63.2 63.2 70 
C 18.2 16.4 18.8 25 25 
D/E 26.9 2 2.8 4 3 
Source: Prepared by the authors. 
Table 2 provides a clue for understanding why and how Positivo Informatics 
became the market leader in Brazil; its specialization in the retail market aimed at the 
lower income classes and the policies which boost consumption turned Positivo 
Informatics into one of the few computer suppliers for this population in the country.  
 
 
6. DISCUSSION ON THE COMPETENCE ACCUMULATION PROCESS 
OF POSITIVO INFORMATICS 
At a glance, it is possible to see that Positivo Informatics is heavily focused on the domestic 
market, which is experiencing rapid growth since 2005. Indeed, the income increase enjoyed by the 
poorer classes provided the company with a great opportunity for expansion. Nevertheless, any 
computer producer could survive exploring the Brazilian market, thus, Positivo Informatics 
managed to acquire some advantages over its competitors. 
There is no doubt that Positivo Informatics holds a strong competitive position 
in the desktop segment and the competences the company has acquired over the years 
provided it with advantages over its national competitors. However, the firm is 
constrained by the technology and its desktop capabilities cannot be applied to 
notebooks. The company weakness becomes clear when it comes to the lack of 
competences aimed at notebooks, although there is a recent process of replacing desktops 
by notebooks. Despite Positivo Informatics holds a large market share in the notebook 
segment, the company has no technological competences related to the development of 
new batteries and it is unable to produce notebooks using new materials as the 
multinational corporations can do. These kinds of competence increase the 
competitiveness of any company and enable it to compete internationally in various 
markets. The notebook segment shows that Positivo Informatics has not the same advantages it 
enjoys with regard to the desktop segment. These products require higher appropriability of 
innovations, and the focus on poorer classes is not an advantage with regard to the notebook 
segment.  
The technological competences of Positivo Informatics do not distinguish this company 
from the multinational corporations, although some competences are more advanced in Positivo 
Informatics than in other Brazilian computer producers. It became clear that the competitiveness of 
this company is not based on its technological capabilities.  
The ability to take the leadership position in the retail market by means of an opportunity 
is the main reason for the competitiveness of Positivo Informatics. The technological competences 
accumulated by the company constitute an evolution with regard to its consolidation in the retail 
market, generating a competence creation process which leads to the accumulation of a specific 
knowledge in the Brazilian context. However, the knowledge elements increasing the 
competitiveness of Positivo Informatics are not related to a long run strategy associated to an 
effective industrial policy; indeed, its competitiveness may be pointed out as a consequence of the 
implementation of the Wintel paradigm in Brazil. 
The Wintel paradigm constrains the expansion options of Positivo Informatics and 
shapes its innovative efforts. The pressures faced by Positivo Informatics are also derived from the 
other computer producers operating in the Brazilian market, especially the multinational 
corporations. These global players have huge scales and hold an enormous amount of knowledge 
on the industry that increase the effectiveness of their innovative efforts, even though their efforts 
are focused on the secondary paradigm elements. 
In Brazil, the multinational corporations face difficulties to adapt their products to the 
needs of Brazilian consumers; they have a limited ability to design computers for our market, since 
most consumers are from the lower classes (Table 2). This constraint faced by the multinational 
corporations helps explaining the gap observed in the Brazilian computer industry when Metron 
bankrupted. This allowed Positivo Informatics to become a successful computer producer focused 
on the lower social strata in Brazil.  
The specialization of Positivo Informatics in this population is a two-edged sword: on 
one side, this focus is responsible for rapid growth and high competiveness; on the other side, this 
specialization constrains the company ability to add differentials generated by means of internal 
innovative efforts. Positivo Informatics can only add differentials to its products when the 
technology involved is stabilized in the market, since this fact allows keeping computer prices 
stable. This process, somehow, keeps pace with the population income, while the multinational 
corporations focus on adding differentials to their computers. 
The Positivo Informatics case points out that the Brazilian computer industry is 
extremely dependent on the domestic market expansion, especially among the lower classes. 
Currently, this is not the focus of multinational corporations. Thus, the actual competitors of 
Positivo Informatics are the other national companies which adopt the same strategy. In 
other words, all nationally owned companies operating in the Brazilian computer 
industry are focused on the lower income population.  
The Positivo Informatics specialization in the lower income classes may be 
regarded as a choice allowing this company to avoid a direct competition with the 
multinational corporations within the Brazilian borders. The trajectory of Positivo 
Informatics led it to bridge a gap observed in the national computer industry, within the 
Wintel paradigm, which could not be bridged by the multinational corporations due to 
the little attention they pay to the lower classes, that became relevant with regard to 
computer consumption in 2004 and 2005 (when Positivo Informatics started selling its 
computers in retail stores). It is worth observing that the entrance of this company into 
the retail market coincided with the creation of government policies that boost computer 
consumption among the poorer classes. Thus, any nationally owned company could 
occupy the same position as Positivo Informatics.  
When Positivo Informatics entered into the retail segment, notebooks were not 
disseminated in the Brazilian market. However, nowadays, desktops have been replaced 
by notebooks. If this fact is taken into account in the analysis of the Positivo Informatics 
case, its technological weaknesses become even more apparent. The participation of 
Positivo Informatics in the computer industry is not constrained only by the kind of 
consumer, but also by the kind of products the company produces. The competitiveness 
of Positivo Informatics heavily relies on the desktop segment and the company has not a 
major market share in the notebook segment. As discussed before, notebooks are 
technologically more complex than desktops, and the innovations related to notebooks 
may generate higher appropriability. Thus, notebooks are not regarded as a priority by 
the customers of Positivo Informatics.  
Despite the success of Positivo Informatics in bridging the gap observed in the 
lower classes, the multinational corporations have also developed strategies and 
competences with regard to this market segment. The Brazilian market expansion has 
opened way to multinational corporations able to provide cheaper products, such as 
Lenovo and Acer. 
The Positivo Informatics case shows that the local competitiveness of a 
Brazilian computer producer is, to a large extent, explained by its non-technological 
competences, especially the exclusive agreement with Casas Bahia. Positivo Informatics 
constitutes an interesting example of paradigm constraints; due to its specialization in the 
lower income population and in the desktop segment, Positivo Informatics is unable to 
rely on technological competences related to notebooks and, thus, its market 
competences are different from those of multinational corporations. Through the Positivo 
Informatics case, we may infer that a company can be competitive in the Brazilian 
computer industry without accumulating technological competences or having a strongly 
innovative behavior.  
7. CONCLUSION 
The technological paradigm concept applied to the world computer industry, along with the idea of 
complementary assets and competences proposed by Teece (1986), allows dividing this paradigm 
into two: the paradigm core and the paradigm border. Dividing this paradigm into different 
competences and appropriability levels implies that there is a hierarchy within the paradigm, 
something which differently influences both on the industry technological trajectory and the 
paradigm shift. By means of the analysis of world computer industry, two groups of companies and 
competences were set: the paradigm core companies (Intel and Microsoft), which control the 
computer platform capabilities, and the non-paradigm core companies, which control the 
secondary competences in the computer industry, in other words, these companies produce the 
components that will be connected to the platform. 
In Brazil, computer producers do not expend high amounts on innovative activities 
(Graphic 3), however, the nationally owned companies hold the biggest market shares (Table 1). 
Thus, in Brazil, the computer producers can be competitive despite their lack of technological 
competences. A brief analysis of the Brazilian computer industry shows that the companies are 
devoted to the domestic market and their growth is, to a large extent, explained by the national 
polices which boost computer production and consumption. 
This analysis of the biggest Brazilian computer producer is relevant for understanding 
this peculiarity; Positivo Informatics holds the biggest market share and it is extremely competitive 
within the national borders, however, in international terms, its market share is irrelevant. 
We may infer that Positivo Informatics does not neglect technological development, but 
the accumulation of technological competences is not responsible for its competitiveness. The 
competitiveness of Positivo Informatics is mainly derived from the exclusive agreement signed 
between this company and Casas Bahia, which has led Positivo Informatics to have a great 
demand for its desktops. When this paradigm was introduced to the Brazilian context, it did not 
apply to the entire Brazilian computer industry. A spot emerged for companies able to produce 
computers aimed at the low income population. Positivo Informatics managed to consolidate itself 
in this specific segment of the national market, but this process has brought some difficulties for 
the company with regard to its way of accumulating technological competences.  
As an overall conclusion, we may claim that the competitiveness enjoyed by the 
Brazilian computer producers is not based on the accumulation of technological competences 
because of constraints posed by the Wintel paradigm; that is the reason why all nationally owned 
companies are specialized in the lower income population and in the desktop segment. 
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